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Kanishka  Jayasuriya,  Professor  of  Political  Science  at  Murdoch  University  in  Perth, 
Australia and author of two monographs  – Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order: 
Legitimacy and Regulation (2005) and Statecraft, Welfare and the Politics of Inclusion 
(2006) – argues that changing forms of governance and new regulative laws are enabling 
the transnationalization of institutions within national states. He also interprets these 
changes as giving rise to a new type of institutional struggle unique to globalisation. For 
social  scientists  in  general  and  political  economists  in  particular,  Jayasuriya’s  work 
provides a useful lens through which to understand intra-state transformation in the 
global  epoch.  By  rejecting  Realist/Weberian  conceptions  of  the  state  and  drawing 
inspiration instead from materialist state theory, he understands state transformation as a 
reflection of ongoing processes linked to socio-economic forces that are novel to the 
historical present. And in the wake of the global financial crisis, he argues, we should not 
see the state as either disappearing or returning, for it is continuing to transform in ways 
peculiar to the age of globalism. The real question is for whom states will act in the future. 
In  order  to  answer  this,  Jayasuriya  suggests  that  we  must  look  to  transformations 
occurring within the national state, for it is these that are changing statecraft as we know 
it. 
  In this interview, Jayasuriya discusses some of his main concepts and theories, 
such  as  the  regulatory  state;  meta-governance;  the  transition  from  ‘social 
constitutionalism’  to  ‘economic  constitutionalism’;  and  describes  how  each  of  these 
relate to the ongoing crisis of global capitalism. He clarifies his views on the idea of a 
transnational capitalist class, arguing that there must be “different fractions within it”; and 
goes on to discuss the connection of his theories on state-transformation with the related Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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works of William Robinson and Martin Shaw. Finally, he discusses some of the theorists 
that have influenced his work – such as Nicos Poulantzas, Carl Schmitt, Franz Neumann, 
and Amartya Sen – and briefly describes his areas of ongoing research.  
 
Jeb  Sprague  (JS): Jeb  Sprague  (JS): Jeb  Sprague  (JS): Jeb  Sprague  (JS):  You  have  previously  written  about  the  emergence  of  a  global 
regulatory regime characterized by processes of “decentralized enforcement”, whereby 
supranational  institutions  lay  down  standards  for  member  states  and  monitor  their 
compliance rather than directly regulating their activities (Jayasuriya, 1999, p. 452). You 
also suggest that different institutions within national states have become mechanisms for 
internalized regulation and jumping-off points for transnational governance practices. 
How do you see these processes as being affected by the global financial crisis, which has 
sent out a large shockwave across the entire system? 
    
Kanishka  Jayasuriya  (KJ) Kanishka  Jayasuriya  (KJ) Kanishka  Jayasuriya  (KJ) Kanishka  Jayasuriya  (KJ):  My  work,  particularly  on  the  regulatory  state,  has 
emphasized the transformation of the state via complex systems of multi-level regulation, 
meta-governance, and systems of soft law, all of which enable the trans-nationalization of 
the state apparatus (1999; 2001a; and 2001b). This approach has a lot in common with 
the  transnational  state  perspective  (e.g.  Robinson,  2001a;  and  2004),  although  my 
approach differs in that it places the emphasis on how, and through what mechanisms, 
regulatory regimes become the centre of political conflict within the state. Equally, my 
work has sought to emphasize the often fragmented and contradictory character of the 
emerging  regulatory  and  administrative  rules  and  standards  that  shape  transnational 
regulation. It is the understanding of the nature and dynamics of these regulatory rules 
that should be at the heart of the analysis of transnational governance.  
  I find it rather curious that the global financial crisis — like the events of 
September 11 — has led to a revival in the literature of the notion that we are about to 
witness the return of the state. For example, it assumes that the neoliberal transformation 
over the last three decades occurred without state intervention, when in fact, as many 
have  argued  –  though  with  seemingly  little  effect  –neoliberalism  itself  required  the 
construction of a different form of state: the regulatory state. In this sense, the last couple 
of  decades  have  seen  not  the  decline  but  the  transformation  of  the  state.  This  is 
something  that  is  totally  missing  in  the  writing  of  those  arguing  that  the  ‘state’  has 
returned.  
  The real question is: what happens to this regulatory state after the global 
financial crisis? It is clear that one of the elements of the present crisis is the manner in 
which various strands of ‘soft law’ — such as regulatory standards and principles — have 
been  widely  questioned  and  challenged.  This  includes  the  role  of  private  standards 
organizations  such  as  the  international  ranking  agencies.  Nevertheless,  I  think  this 
regulatory  shift,  which,  as  I  have  argued,  involves  substantial  multi-level  governance Interview with Kanishka Jayasuriya, Sprague 
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within the state, will not be easily reversed as a result of the crisis. Indeed, in my view there 
is already an intensification of regulatory governance rather than any shift back towards a 
more direct role for the state reminiscent of post-war Keynesianism. My short answer is 
that changes are likely to occur within the regulatory state — in actors, instruments, and 
agencies  —  but  no  fundamental  shift  is  likely  in  the  form  or  nature  of  regulatory 
governance.  
  The reason for this is, as I have tried to indicate in my recent publications, that 
the  shift  from  what  I  have  called  ‘social  constitutionalism’  to  ‘economic 
constitutionalism’ is driven by changes in ‘work’ and ‘war’. The twin transformation of the 
social settlement within advanced industrial states and the end of the Cold War heralded 
a change in the politics that was based on the constitutional and political recognition of 
class politics. This social settlement had a global dimension because the Cold Car was 
essentially a social and political conflict between competing economic and social systems. 
In a similar way this conflict between the two major superpowers was also fundamental to 
the way in which these social and political conflicts were played out in the Third World.    
This point is of course central to the argument of Odd Arne Westad in his book The 
Global Cold War (2007).    The core of my argument is that changes in ‘work’ and ‘war’ 
have resulted in a shift towards a form of economic constitutionalism geared towards the 
promotion and regulation of economic order. For this reason the deep-seated structural 
transformation of the state over the last three decades means that we cannot simply go 
back  to  the  ‘social  constitutional’  order  of  the  post-Second  World  War  period. 
Nevertheless some important changes are now underway in the nature and form  of 
regulatory governance. Some of the significant changes are: 
 
1.  The emphasis on the concept and practice of the ‘systemic regulation of risk’ of 
financial governance. This is potentially an important and intriguing development 
in that it seeks to create new notions of ‘public responsibility’ within forms of market 
governance.  In  this  sense  it  represents  an  amplification  of  the  idea  of  market 
citizenship, which I have discussed in my book Statecraft, Welfare and the Politics of 
Inclusion  (2006),  as  well  as  in  other  work  I  have  done  on  accountability 
communities  (2008b;  2008c;  and  2010a).  The  significance  of  this  notion  of 
‘systemic  risk’  lies  in  the  way  it  creates  a  public  domain  within  market-based 
regulatory governance operating across national boundaries. In other words, forms 
of ‘publicness’ are created within market-centered forms of governance. This to me 
is an intriguing development that signals an important move away from pre-crisis 
forms of regulatory governance. Indeed one of the striking elements of the Obama 
Presidency (as well as the social democratic government of Kevin Rudd or Gordon 
Brown) is exactly this ‘third way’ approach to regulatory governance. It reflects one Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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strand of regulation that socializes neoliberalism in a way that opens up interesting 
political possibilities.  
 
2.  The other crucial element of recent regulatory changes is the development of hybrid 
public-private  forms  of  governance  such  as  that  exemplified  in  the  institutional 
design of the Troubled Asset Relief Program in the US. What matters here is not 
whether actors are public or private per se; it is that the relationship between these 
actors  within  new  institutional  settings  challenges  the  distinction  between  the 
‘public’ and the ‘private’ and undermines the ‘national-global’ binary created by 
Weberian  and  Westphalian  notions  of  statehood.  I  suspect  that  these  new 
institutional ensembles of public and private will become increasingly important 
within emerging forms of governance. This to me is an interesting area of research 
for any budding Political Economy PhD students.  
 
JS:  JS:  JS:  JS: You have an expertise in transnational law. Parallel to the global financial crisis, do you 
see many changes being made to global legal frameworks – for example, with respect to 
the juridical role of supranational forums such as the World Trade Organization, or to 
state and corporate arbitrations? 
    
KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  One  of  the  significant  elements  I  see  is  the  increasing  importance  of  ‘global 
administrative  law’.  This  is  a  term  used  by  a  group  of  legal  scholars  at  New  York 
University  to  identify  and  analyze  the  role  of  notions  of  review,  monitoring  and 
participation, both in the administrative acts of international public agencies and through 
the actions of international non-governmental organizations such as standard setting 
bodies.  This  work  essentially  examines  the  role  of  administrative  rules,  which  is  a 
question I have pursued in my earlier work on global regulatory governance and multi-
level regulation. What I like about this approach is that it can be used to analyze the way 
in which new concepts of public law are being used to constitute and implement new 
forms of governmental authority. It gives us a way to look at the ‘governmentalization’ of 
international rules, which is at the core of the new transnational regulation.  
  Here I would like to point to the growing importance of legitimacy within 
regulatory  structures,  which  I  have  already  touched  on  in  relation  to  the  notion  of 
systemic  regulation.  At  a  conceptual  level  I  have  developed  the  notion  of  the 
accountability communities as a framework to understand the constitution of public 
authority  within  transnational  regulatory  regimes.  Accountability  communities  are 
complex, and they are composed of public and/or private organizations endowed with 
capacities  to  perform  legislative,  monitoring,  and  compliance  activities  in  specific 
functionally based regulatory regimes both within and beyond national boundaries. They 
operate through institutional forms such as deliberative forums, markets, or network Interview with Kanishka Jayasuriya, Sprague 
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mechanisms. Furthermore, by virtue of particular understandings of the discourses of 
accountability that bind various actors together, these communities enable the location 
and identification of public authority, not to mention the ‘public’ to which account is 
given within regulatory regimes (see 2008a; and 2008b). In this way, an accountability 
community defines public authority within regulatory regimes and provides the basis on 
which  new  forms  of  state  and  market-making  are  created.  These  accountability 
communities are crucial not only to the transnationalization of the state but also to the 
very nature of politics, which they effectively shape. 
  The other feature to which I want to draw attention is the crucial importance 
of the notion of meta-governance – that is, the governance of governance. On this basis 
there is a complex interlay between the global, the regional, and the national. Meta-
governance, through agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or even 
via regional multilateral banks, has been amplified during the current financial crisis. In 
addition to this, I also see a hardening of soft law – that is, the rules, standards, and 
benchmarks through which regulation is implemented. I think soft law is still critical to 
the way in which new forms of state power are being created, but these new powers are 
dependent on ‘harder’ forms of state power. All of these elements are crucial to the 
development of a transnational regulation and governmental authority.  
  In my view, those arguing for a transnational polity need to be more cognizant 
of these transformations in the administrative form of the rules and regulations that are 
located within the state, rather than in a transnational entity above the state.  
 
JS:  JS:  JS:  JS: You have previously used Carl Schmitt’s notion of a ‘state of exception’ to describe a 
de-formalization of international law and a concentration of emergency powers in the 
hands of the executive branches of state the world over (Jayasuriya, 2005). How do you 
see these powers playing-out during the global financial crisis? Do you see a ‘state of 
exception’ being explicitly deployed by state leaders and other elites implicated in the 
circuits of global capital accumulation? 
    
KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  I  think  notions  of  exception  and  emergency  are  important  in  relation  to  the 
contemporary  crisis  but  not  in  the  currently  fashionable  way  of  understanding 
emergencies as a ‘zone of non-law’. In one sense, the common element of both 9/11 and 
the current crisis lies in the ushering-in of a global state of emergency; and in a distinct 
form of international emergency regulation and standards – very much in the form of a 
global administrative law – that reframes the jurisdictional practices that have shaped 
national constitutional formations. The economic crisis, like 9/11, was a global state of 
emergency that may lead to the emergence of new jurisdiction of governance layered 
onto the domains of national and international law.  
  With the current crisis, we are back to the idea of global administrative law, and Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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here too as in the 9/11 crisis, new forms of state power have been created that allow 
actors to bypass ‘national’ constitutional and administrative structures. In the case of 
9/11 these new forms of state power have made the boundaries between state and non-
state actors and civilians and combatants more flexible.  
  One  of  the  arguments  I  make  in  a  paper  on  the  international  state  of 
emergency with reference to 9/11 is that society creates distinctions between legal spaces 
that lead to the construction of new legal subjects and categories — for example, through 
new forms  of  preventive detention and control orders — which establish new legal 
jurisdictions within national constitutions (2008d). Novel administrative forms of power 
established during the current crisis through the exercise of emergency powers create 
new administrative domains ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the national state with strikingly similar 
effects to that produced by the events of 9/11. The crucial point here is the creation of 
new forms of administrative power that transcend the national and international divide.  
 
JS:  JS:  JS:  JS: Furthermore, how do you see the growing importance of the G20 in place of the G8? 
Does it reflect an inevitable attempt on the part of elites to develop institutions capable of 
governing and stabilizing global capital? More specifically, the G20 appears to have been 
focused  on  coordinating  the  stimulus  packages  and  regulatory  initiatives  of  different 
central banks. In April 2009, for example, it agreed for the IMF’s floating currency Special 
Drawing Rights to be increased by nine-fold, and in September 2009 they moved forward 
on a host of new regulatory frameworks. What are your thoughts on this? 
    
KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  KJ: Yes – I agree with you about the enhanced role of the IMF in the crisis – a point that 
has also been made by Paul Cammack (2009). Equally important in this regard is the way 
the US Federal Reserve has taken on the role of a harsh policy-coordinating body for the 
global financial system. This flies in the face of those who argue for multi-polarity. In 
some ways the Fed rather than the IMF  has become the global central bank.  More 
important than this, though, is the role played by networks of central banks in managing 
the crisis. This is exactly the kind of transnational regulatory regime that is crucial to 
understanding the embryonic structures of global governance.  
  One of the interesting elements of the crisis is the way in which new forms of 
regional governance are being used to respond to the crisis — a process we describe as 
‘regulatory regionalism’. Shahar Hameiri and myself have elaborated on this regulatory 
regionalism framework in a recent Special Issue of the Australian Journal of International 
Affairs (Hameiri 2009a; 2009b; and Jayasuriya, 2009). This has been expanded further in 
a forthcoming special issue of the journal Globalisation, Societies and Education on the 
topic ‘Regulatory Regionalism and the Governance of Higher Education’, which I have 
edited with Susan Robertson of the University of Bristol (Jayasuriya and Robertson, 
2010).  Interview with Kanishka Jayasuriya, Sprague 
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  This is not simply a question of the global against the regional; it is about the 
way  in  which  the  regional  is  layered  onto  global  and  national  regulation  in  the 
implementation  of  administrative  rules.  In  the  East  Asian  context,  a  particularly 
important role has been played by the Asia Development Bank (ADB) in providing the 
framework for financial and economic policy at the national and sub-national level. The 
ADB has also played a significant role in regional financial initiatives. These changes 
reinforce initiatives such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which provided emergency 
funds for currency stabilization in the event of a financial tsunami sweeping through the 
region, such as the 1997-98 Asian crisis (or the 2008 credit crisis). The initiative is limited 
in scope as well as in terms of the volume of funds available for emergency funding. 
However, the very fact that a currency stabilization scheme such as the CMI is on the 
policy  agenda  is  itself  a  major  step  away  from  the  Asia-Pacific  region’s  traditional 
emphasis on trade liberalization. 
 
JS:  JS:  JS:  JS: In much of your work you speak of a transnational class, echoing a literature that links 
the  creation  of  a  transnational  capitalist  class  (TCC)  to  the  rise  of  transnational 
corporations during the last quarter of the twentieth century (Robinson & Harris, 2000; 
and  Sklair  2001).    More  recently,  Jerry  Harris  has  conceptualized  a  statist-TCC 
connected to sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in countries such as China, Russia and the 
Persian Gulf States (2008b). Even SWFs, he suggests, are beginning to transnationalize. 
The Financial Times has made similar observations, writing of the South Korean SWF’s 
strategic joint investment with its Malaysian counterpart and an Austrian state-owned 
fund:  “The  deals  are  among  the  first  alliances  between  wealth  funds  from  different 
countries as they seek to diversify their investment portfolios” (Jung-a, 2009). What are 
your thoughts on these new developments? 
    
KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  KJ: I am persuaded by Harris’ take on this issue. It seems to me that the basic point here is 
that there is no monolith transnational capitalist class; rather, we have different fractions 
within  it.  What  is  clear  is  that  the  idea  of  ‘national  capital’,  or  indeed,  national 
developmentalism, is simply not viable in the current circumstances. It is interesting, 
though, that these nationalist ideas have wide currency within much of the developing 
world and I think this is a retrograde step in political terms.  
  It is clear that in East Asia statist forms of capital are becoming much more 
important. The really imperative question here lies in the way these ‘statist’ forms of 
capital are transforming the state in critical ways. In some respects it is commodifying the 
state, which has become a player on international financial markets. See for example the 
role of the Chinese state as a bondholder in the US.  But to give a short answer to your 
question:    We  need  to  be  much  more  cognizant  of  the  differences  within  forms  of 
transnationalised  capital  and  the  way  this  plays  out  in  political  and  policy-making Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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institutions.  
    
JS:  JS:  JS:  JS: You write in a recent article that the “anti-pluralism of the global order reverberates 
within  domestic  politics”  (Jayasuriya,  2008,  p.  31).  You  have  also  said  that  new 
contractual relations are forming between states and their citizens. How might these 
understandings of how the state interacts with its citizens be seen in light of the financial 
crisis?  For  example,  in  California,  corporate  and  state  elites  are  articulating  new 
contractual relations as the state budget deficit climbs and unemployment persists (Davis 
and  Bacon,  2009).  Do  you  see  state  elites  engaging  in  anti-pluralist  projects  tied  to 
globalization  (or,  in  other  words,  as  transnational  elites  re-articulating  governing 
apparatuses in a way that prioritizes global over local strategies of accumulation)? 
    
KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  KJ: This is an interesting question. In one sense I think that over the next two decades we 
will see an ongoing fiscal crisis of the state, which is not going to be easily resolved. It is 
made doubly difficult because of the emerging trilemma of government services – a route 
for  accumulation  and  employment,  a  vehicle  to  enhance  access,  and  a  driver  for 
legitimation. In a sense this is James O’Connor’s thesis on the fiscal crisis of the state with 
a couple of extra twists! (See O’Connor, 2001.) This fiscal crisis is leading to shifts in the 
governance of these services towards more contractual forms. And this is consistent with 
a move towards the development of what I have called a market citizenship. It is this shift 
in the instruments of governance towards ‘executive discretion’ that challenges some of 
the central principles of representative democracy and political pluralism. We need to pay 
much more attention to new modes of political governance.  
  I also want to say that within this framework there is scope for interesting social 
policy experiments such as the basic or participation income proposals, and various ideas 
of empowered participation such as participatory budgeting. This is something on which 
we need more work.  
  On this issue, I would also like to add that both the critical and mainstream 
Political Economy approaches fail to seriously consider the transformation to a post-
industrial economy with a dominant service sector. Many of the developments that are 
crucial to the political economy of the service sector – the new social markets in health 
and education, global cheap labor in the services, and the increasing regulation of service 
professionals – all of these seem to receive little or no attention in the Political Economy 
literature.  
 
JS:  JS:  JS:  JS: I am curious as to your thoughts on some of the other theoretical approaches that 
share your basic understanding of global order. For example, you cite Martin Shaw’s 
Theory of the Global State (2000) in your discussion on the emergence of a “putative set 
of transnational regulatory structures” (2005, p. 21). In another article you cite William Interview with Kanishka Jayasuriya, Sprague 
 
 
135 
Robinson’s  A  Theory  of  Global  Capitalism  and  write  that  his  idea  of  a  nascent 
transnational state forces “us to explore how the national state has been transformed 
through the transnationalization of state actors and institutions”; and that “It compels us 
to confront the way global capitalism has rendered conventional notions of statehood” 
(2004, p. 6). Robinson has written a critique of Shaw’s idealist – rather than materialist – 
conception of a ‘global state’ (2001b). What is your theoretical position in relation to 
these different approaches? 
    
KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  KJ: I find the general approach of the transnational state or globality useful in examining 
some key aspects of the global political economy. It moves us beyond unhelpful debates 
about the return of the state and/or misguided attempts to perceive global conflict in 
terms of a return to national developmentalism. In sum, I think it usefully takes us beyond 
the  methodological  nationalism  that  troubles  much  of  the  mainstream  and  critical 
Political Economy literatures.  
  Having said this, my own approach differs from these perspectives in that I see 
the crucial issue as the transformation of the state rather than the emergence of a new 
transnational  state.  At  the  same  time,  we  need  to  see  the  development  of  these 
transnational forms of governance as an ongoing process that involves accommodation 
and contestation between various ‘national’ and transnational regimes within the state. I 
would  emphasize  the  strategic  choices  and  conflicts  between  key  actors  in  rescaling 
projects. It is these kinds of conflicts that drive state transformation, and I think this 
should be at the centre of a research agenda on transnational regulation.  
  In  addition,  I  think  we  should  place  more  emphasis  on  the  nature  and 
dynamics of the emerging transnational administrative/regulatory  law, even if this is 
often of the soft law variety. As I indicate in my responses above, it is the complex and 
fragmented nature of this global administrative law that defines the new transnational 
governance. This transnational law and governance is likely to be very different from what 
is usually associated with the national state. This is something that is neglected by notions 
such as globality or the transnational state.  
 
JS: JS: JS: JS: Who have been the most influential writers for the development of your own ideas? 
 
KJ: KJ: KJ: KJ: A strong influence on my work is Nicos Poulantzas, particularly his later work. I think 
especially useful are his ideas of institutional struggles within the state and the broader 
notion  of  state  transformation.  In  particular  I  find  his  work  on  the  shifts  and 
transformation from mass politics to ‘authoritarian statism’ very useful (see 1978). 
  In the areas of legal theory, I have drawn on the work of Franz Neumann, 
particularly his notion  of the de-formalization of law  and its relationship to broader 
economic  and  social  changes  (see  1957;  and  1986).  Other  Frankfurt  School  legal Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 3 (2010) 
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theorists such as Otto Kirchheimer have been very important for my work too. Indeed, 
the broader Weimar debates on legal theory – Heller, Kelsen and Schmitt – are a very 
useful resource. I would locate  Schmitt (1927)  within the  context of these ‘Weimar 
debates’. His notions of constitutional order and exception have been very useful tools 
but these tools need to be used critically and placed within the context of the Weimar 
debates. The broader point I would make is that these debates took place within the 
context of a broader conversation about Marx and Weber. It is this conversation that I 
have drawn on and which I think we need to resurrect in social and political theory. 
  My work on social policy has been influenced by the work of Amartya Sen on 
capabilities,  which  provides  an  important  pathway  for  the  development  of  a  critical 
theory of justice (see 1979; 1985; and 1999). This is something that I will be working on 
in the future. 
 
JS:  JS:  JS:  JS: What areas of research are you focused on now? 
    
KJ:  KJ:  KJ:  KJ: There are three areas of my ongoing research that link in with some of the issues 
noted in this interview. First, I am continuing to work on the issue of the transformation 
from social to economic constitutionalism, focusing more specifically on its implications 
for the future of democratic politics. I am particularly interested in exploring what forms 
of democratic politics are possible within emerging forms of economic constitutionalism. 
  Second,  I  am  interested  in  the  issue  of  the  legitimacy  of  transnational 
regulatory regimes, and here I develop the concept of accountability communities noted 
in  the  responses  to  one  of  your  previous  questions.  In  a  related  fashion,  I  am  also 
interested in teasing out the political and legal implications of the development of so-
called soft law. What does this imply for our understanding of both the law and the state?
  Finally, I continue to work on issues of social policy with an emphasis on 
experiments to ‘socialize neoliberalism’ in places as diverse as Brazil, China, and South 
Africa. This is a  continuation  of  my work on social policy and the politics of social 
inclusion. 
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